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This paper presents a participation game experiment to study the impact of uncertainty and costly 
political participation on the incidence of reform. Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) show that 
uncertainty about who will ultimately gain or lose as a result of a reform can prevent its 
adoption. We introduce intra-group conflict into this framework by incorporating costly political 
participation, which creates a natural incentive for free-riding on fellow group members’ efforts 
to influence policy outcomes. An agent, however, may still be willing to participate if her 
participation is likely to affect the policy outcome given the probabilities of participation by 
others. Our experimental findings show that uncertainty reduces the incidence of reform even 
with costly political participation, and that an increase in the cost of participation reduces the 
participation of all agents, regardless of whether they belong to the majority and minority. This 
second result cannot be reconciled with the standard mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, but is 
consistent with the quantal response equilibrium.  
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This paper presents a laboratory participation game experiment to study the impact of 
individual-specific uncertainty and costly political participation on the incidence of reform. In a 
pioneering study, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991, hereafter FR) show that uncertainty regarding the 
distribution of gains and losses from reform can prevent efficiency-enhancing reforms from 
taking place. They argue that when making decisions regarding whether to support a reform, 
citizens may not know whether they will benefit or suffer from the reform. If policy outcomes 
are determined by majority preferences and the majority estimate ex ante that their expected 
payoff from the reform is lower than their expected payoff from the status quo, then the reform 
will not take place. The reform can fail in this way even if everyone knows that it will improve 
the welfare of the majority of the citizens ex post and will thus generate majority support for its 
continuation if it is adopted.  
This insight has been influential in the recent literature on the political economy of 
reform as well as in other areas of political economy.
1 To our knowledge, however, there has not 
been any empirical work that provides a direct test of the validity and significance of the 
mechanism articulated in this influential paper. Furthermore, to focus on how individual-specific 
uncertainty can lead to the non-adoption of potential Pareto-improving reform, FR do not 
develop an explicit model of the political process. Instead they assume that political participation 
is costless and that policy reform is more likely to be adopted if it is favored by a larger number 
                                                 
1 The importance of individual-specific uncertainty has been emphasized in general discussions of the political 
economy of reforms (see, for examples, surveys such as Rodrik (1996), Robinson (1998), and Drazen (2000, 
chapters 10 and 13) and the references cited there). It also features prominently in the literature on the merit of 
gradualism vs. big bang in reform (e.g., Sachs, 1995, Aslund et al., 1996, the relevant essays in Sturzennegger and 
Tommasi, 1998, and Laffont and Qian, 1999). Highly selective examples of recent studies in other areas of political 
economy that have addressed the issue of individual-specific uncertainty include empirical studies of public 
preferences over tax, deficit, and spending (Hansen, 1998), the political economy of GATT (Bagwell and Staiger, 
1999) and the political economy of public enterprise reform (Campos and Esfahani, 2000).   2
of individuals. In this paper, drawing on the participation game framework of Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1983), we extend the FR model to allow for costly political participation. As we shall 
demonstrate formally later, when participation is costly it is possible that uncertainty can actually 
increase, instead of decrease, the incidence of reform, contrary to the FR model with costless 
participation.  
We were motivated to extend the FR model to allow for costly political participation for 
two main reasons. First, when political participation is costly—for example, the act of voting by 
citizens, or the effort of lobbying by interest groups in affecting policy outcomes—whether or 
not a reform will be adopted depends on the actual support expressed by those citizens who incur 
the costs to participate in the political process, rather than simply the ex ante preferences of the 
majority of the citizens. For example, even if majority voting is used to determine whether or not 
a reform will take place and a majority of citizens prefer the status quo to reform, if more 
supporters than opponents of the reform turn out to vote then the reform will take place. We 
show that costly political participation in the FR model typically leads to multiple equilibria, and 
uncertainty does not necessarily lead to a lower incidence of reform. This makes the laboratory 
method particularly attractive. Besides enabling us to provide a direct test of the original FR 
model, it also enables us to determine empirically which of the multiple equilibria is more 
consistent with subjects’ behavior when participation is costly. 
Second, the incorporation of costly participation in the FR model can be viewed as a first 
step to understand how the presence of both inter and intra-group conflicts affect the incidence of 
political participation and reform. As Drazen (2000) points out, the key defining characteristic of 
the fast-growing literature in the political economy of reform is its emphasis on heterogeneity 
and conflict of interest. In analyzing how heterogeneity and conflict of interest determine  3
whether or not reform will take place, scholars usually view economic policy as determined by 
conflict between contending social groups or their political representatives (Haggard, 1997). 
Although many of the important contributions on the political economy of reform collected in 
Sturzennegger and Tommasi (1998) or discussed in Drazen (2000) study how strategic 
interactions between competing interest groups determine whether or not reform will take place 
(e.g., Alesina and Drazen, 1991; Velasco, 1998), none of them studies the interactions between 
inter- and intra-group conflicts explicitly.  
Explicitly incorporating costly political participation into the original FR framework 
introduces intra-group conflict in a very simple way. While an agent wants a particular outcome 
to be adopted, when political participation is costly she will prefer that others in her group incur 
the necessary costs to bring about this outcome. This free-rider problem (Olson, 1965) thus 
creates intra-group conflicts within both the groups of supporters and opponents of reform. As 
emphasized by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) and Bornstein (1992) and Bornstein et al. 
(1994), however, when deciding whether to incur the cost to influence a policy outcome, an 
agent should take into account how likely members from the opposing group as well as fellow 
members from her own group will participate in the political process. This implies that although 
an agent has the incentive to free-ride on her fellow members’ efforts, she will be willing to incur 
the cost to participate in the political process if she believes that her participation will likely be 
decisive in determining the policy outcome given the probabilities of participation by other 
supporters and opponents of the policy.  
This study contributes to both the literature on the political economy of reform and the 
participation game literature. As a contribution to the literature on reform, it provides direct 
empirical laboratory confirmation of the original FR argument that individual-specific  4
uncertainty reduces the incidence of reform when political participation is costless. It further 
presents laboratory evidence that uncertainty also reduces the incidence of reform even when 
participation is costly, despite the fact that theoretically, uncertainty can increase or decrease the 
incidence of reform when political participation is costly.  
As a contribution to the participation game literature, to our knowledge this study is the 
first laboratory investigation regarding how changes in participation cost affect the incidence of 
participation. Another novel feature of our participation game experiment is that we employ 
competing groups of unequal sizes. Like most of the treatments in Schram and Sonnemans 
(1996a, 1996b), Bornstein and his colleagues employ equal numbers of players in each group. 
Equal-sized groups is a special case that is qualitatively different from unequal-sized groups; for 
example, pure strategy Nash equilibria typically only exist with equal group sizes. Moreover, it 
is only possible to evaluate the interesting hypotheses regarding majority versus minority 
participation rates with unequal group sizes. We find that an increase in the cost of political 
participation reduces the participation of all agents, regardless of whether they belong to the 
majority or minority; and overall, changes in the cost of political participation do not have a 
significant impact on the incidence of reform in this experiment. These results are not consistent 
with the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of the participation game. We then demonstrate that a 
quantal response equilibrium approach developed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)—which 
allows for bounded rationality in decision-making by the agents but maintains the equilibrium 
restriction that agents are playing (stochastic) best responses—organizes the data better than the 
Nash equilibrium does. This is broadly consistent with laboratory findings in related binary 
choice games presented in Goeree and Holt (2000).  
Before proceeding to the experiment and its findings, it is useful to first pause for some  5
remarks regarding the use of laboratory methods in the study of the political economy of reform. 
Although the theoretical literature on the political economy of reform has deepened our 
understanding about how distributional conflict can prevent efficiency-enhancing reform from 
taking place, systematic empirical work that provides direct tests of the validity and significance 
of the mechanisms articulated in these models has been limited. One reason for the lack of 
empirical studies is that most of these typically game-theoretic models explain policy outcomes 
as a result of strategic interaction of forward-looking agents, and qualitative features of the 
equilibria often depend sensitively on the specific assumptions of the game structure (Saint-Paul, 
2002). Moreover, this reform literature explains policy outcomes using political variables such as 
the distribution of voters’ preferences and the nature of political institutions (see, for example, 
Drazen, 2000, and Haggard, 2000). But the time variation of these variables is often limited, 
leading to a classic identification problem (Saint-Paul, 2002).  
Laboratory studies can manipulate explanatory variables of a theory as treatment 
variables, allowing for more direct tests of theoretical models that can complement field 
empirical work on reform. The experiment reported here is a test of an influential model of 
reform, rather than empirical work on reform per se. But as we argue in Cason and Mui (2003), 
we believe that sustained dialogues between theorists, experimenters and practitioners should 
eventually generate useful insights and tools for addressing policy questions more directly. In the 
immediate and foreseeable future, however, laboratory studies will be most useful in providing 
direct controlled tests of theoretical models, as well as in generating new empirical regularities 
regarding human behavior in these reform settings that may guide future theoretical work. The 
goal here is to learn about the behavior of the models, since the models are used to provide 
insight into the factors influencing reform.  6
In Cason and Mui (2003), we also point out that the study of reform also poses new 
challenges to experimental economists. Reforms often involve large-scale distributional conflicts 
that affect almost everyone in society, and are rarely occurring political events. The study of 
reform thus requires experimenters to develop methods to study collective decision making for 
large groups in a controlled environment, to capture rarely occurring political events more 
realistically, and to create different political institutions in the laboratory. Such developments 
will make the laboratory method even more useful to address direct policy questions such as the 
comparison of the advantages and disadvantages of different reform policies.  
Another reason that significant research effort is required before the laboratory method 
can be used for more direct study of reform is that currently, a substantial gap exists between the 
stylized theoretical models and the actual political process affecting the adoption of actual 
reforms. As Drazen (2000, p. 404) observes, theorists are often concerned that too many factors 
are at play in practical discussions of real-world reform to model them with any degree of 
theoretical rigor; while practitioners often view theoretical treatments of reform as elegant but 
“hopelessly out of touch with reality.” We hope that by providing direct controlled tests of 
influential theoretical models, and by generating new empirical regularities regarding human 
behavior in these reform settings that may guide future theoretical work, laboratory studies like 
this one can help begin to close this gap in the theoretical literature.   
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 first introduces a laboratory 
participation game that captures the argument in FR that uncertainty can lead to resistance to 
reform. We then develop a theoretical model for this participation game and derive comparative 
static predictions. Section 3 presents the details of the experimental design. Section 4 reports the 
results and Section 5 concludes.   7
2. Theory 
 
2.1 Individual-Specific Uncertainty and Resistance to Reform  
 
To motivate our laboratory environment, consider the following example used by FR to 
explain their basic argument. Figure 1 shows an economy that consists of two-sectors—for 
example, an exporting sector and an import-competing sector—in which individuals are aligned 
uniformly on the [] 1 , 0  continuum. Now consider a trade-reform that will benefit the exporting 
sector (the “winning sector”), but will hurt the import-competing sector (the “losing sector”). 
The magnitudes of the gains and losses are displayed in the top panel of the diagram. Individuals 
in the losing (winning) sector lie to the left (right) of D. The winning sector has 40 percent of the 
individuals in the economy.  
Note that since the total gain is larger than the total loss, this reform constitutes a 
potential Pareto improvement over the status quo. Besides the individuals in the winning sector 
who all gain from the reform, those individuals in the losing sector between E and D will also 
benefit from the reform because they are able to switch to the winning sector. When there is no 
uncertainty regarding who will lose or gain from the reform, the supporters of the reform 
constitute the majority. If the preferences of the majority determine the policy outcome then the 
reform will be adopted. In this example the supporters equal 60 percent of the population, 
comprised of 40 percent already in the winning sector and 20 percent in the losing sector who 
know for certain that they will be able to join the winning sector if the reform is adopted.  
Now suppose that it is common knowledge that this same proportion of individuals in the 
losing sector will be able to switch to the winning sector if the reform takes place, but ex ante it 
is equally likely that any single one of them can switch. In other words, due to individual-
specific uncertainty, individuals in the losing sector do not know who among them will gain or  8
lose if the reform is adopted. As illustrated in the lower panel of the diagram, in this case all 
individuals in the losing sector will prefer the status quo to the reform and the reform will be 
blocked by the majority. This can occur even though it is common knowledge that if the reform 
is adopted, it will enjoy majority support ex post (after the uncertainty is resolved). Therefore, 
the presence of individual-specific uncertainty can prevent a potentially Pareto-improving reform 
from taking place. FR present a two-sector model to show that this conclusion can hold in a 
general equilibrium setting.  
As pointed out in the introduction, when political participation is costly both inter- and 
intra-group conflicts are important in determining the incidence of reform. In deciding whether 
to incur the cost to participate in the political process to influence policy, an agent should take 
into account how likely members from the opposing group as well as fellow members from her 
own group will participate in the political process. Although an agent has the incentive to free-
ride on her fellow members’ participation, she may be willing to incur the cost to participate in 
the political process if she believes that her participation might be decisive in determining the 
policy outcome given the probabilities of participation by others. Different groups may 
participate at different rates, however, so as we show below the participation cost and individual-
specific uncertainty interact so that multiple equilibria exist and the impact of uncertainty on 
reform is ambiguous for positive participation costs. 
The participation game pioneered by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) provides a 
useful framework to address how the presence of both inter- and intra-group conflicts affects 
policy outcomes. For the specific parameterization of the participation game that we employ in 
the laboratory, five players simultaneously choose whether to incur the cost to vote for either 
allocation  X (the status quo) or allocation Y (the reform). The allocation that receives the  9
majority support is implemented. Table 1 presents the payoffs (excluding the cost of voting) of 
this game. In all treatments, two, one, and two subjects are randomly assigned the role of Blue, 
Green, and Red players, respectively, before they make their decisions. Both the Blue and Green 
subjects prefer reform to the status quo. The Blue subjects correspond to the individuals in the 
winning sector, while the Green subject corresponds to those who will be able to switch to the 
winning sector when reform takes place. The Red subjects correspond to those who will remain 
in the losing sector and receive a lower payoff under reform.  
In the Certain Roles treatment, subjects learn their roles before they make their decisions. 
In this case, supporters of the reform constitute the majority. In the Uncertain Roles treatment, 
subjects are only informed whether or not they are Blue or non-Blue subjects before they make 
their decision. The instructions also inform them that “each group will have 2 Blue participants, 
1 Green participant, and 2 Red participants. Therefore, there are 3 non-Blue participants. If you 
learn that you are non-Blue, since roles are assigned randomly you know that there is a 1/3 
chance that you are a Green participant and a 2/3 chance that you are a Red participant.” For the 
three non-Blue subjects the expected payoff from reform is 10/3. This is less than the certain 
payoff of 5 from the status quo, so opponents of reform constitute the majority in the Uncertain 
Roles treatment. Since the only difference between the two treatments is the absence or presence 
of uncertainty, the insight in FR implies that the incidence of reform should be higher in the 
Certain Roles treatment than in the Uncertain Roles treatment.
2 
                                                 
2 The example from FR discussed in this subsection shows how individual-specific uncertainty can cause a reform 
that would otherwise be ex post popular to be rejected ex ante. Fernandez and Rodrik point out, however, that one 
can also construct examples in which uncertainty leads to adoption of reforms that turn out to be unpopular ex post. 
They further emphasize that there is an important asymmetry between the two cases. When a reform is passed that 
turns out to be unpopular, the implementation of the reform reveals information concerning who benefits or suffers. 
Therefore, if there is ever a chance to reconsider, the reform may be repealed. When reform is not adopted, no new 
information is revealed, since the status quo is maintained. This asymmetry is the reason why uncertainty can lead to 
a status quo bias. Our experiment does not attempt to test whether uncertainty leads to a status quo bias, which 
requires us to test whether uncertainty has the hypothesized effects with costly participation in both cases described  10
2.2 The Model 
FR discuss majority voting as one social choice mechanism that translates individual 
preferences into policy outcomes, and Palfrey and Rosenthal developed their model originally to 
address the paradox of voter turnout.
3 Although in what follows we also use the terminology of 
“voting” for policy “outcomes” (as in a referendum), we think that the appropriate interpretation 
of this model is for a small number of interest groups or individual agents deciding whether or 
not to incur participation costs to influence policy. For example, in the context of trade reforms, 
these may be firms and trade unions in both the import-competing and exporting sectors. The 
strategic incentives and interactions highlighted by this model are most significant with a small 
number of players. Larger groups would be more appropriate to study the turnout problem, but 
large groups pose special logistical problems for laboratory experimentation—particularly when 
the experimenter wishes to employ random rematching of multiple groups of subjects in order to 
control for repeated game effects but allow for subject learning.
4 
Besides the impact of uncertainty, our experiment also investigates how changes in the 
cost of political participation affect the incidence of reform. Although Bornstein and his 
colleagues have also used laboratory experiments to study the interactions between inter- and 
                                                                                                                                                             
above. Instead, our experiment directly tests the hypothesis that even in the presence of both inter- and intra-group 
conflicts, uncertainty can still reduce the probability of reform adoption even though the majority would prefer the 
reform in the absence of uncertainty. This is a necessary condition for uncertainty to lead to a status quo bias in the 
presence of costly political participation.  
3 As Downs (1957) points out, it is difficult to reconcile the observation that citizens often vote with the fact that 
voting is costly and the probability of affecting the outcome is often infinitesimal. The game-theoretic approach to 
voter turnout initiated by Ledyard (1981) and further developed by Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983, 1985) investigates 
whether significant turnout can be supported as an equilibrium in strategic models of voting, where the probability 
that an agent’s vote is decisive is determined endogenously. For an assessment of the literature on the paradox of 
voter turnout, see Aldrich (1993).  
4 Isaac et al. (1994) utilize groups of up to 100 subjects in a public goods (voluntary contribution mechanism) 
experiment, and surprisingly they find that contributions increase with group size. Although their experiment 
demonstrates that it is feasible to conduct experiments using large groups, they employ repeated play by the same 
group whereas we want to minimize repeated game incentives by using random group rematching. This random 
rematching is most effective in reducing repeated game incentives if there are many more subjects than the size of 
the individual groups, which makes very large groups extremely difficult to implement in a laboratory.  11
intra-group conflicts (in what they call “team games”), ours is the first experiment that evaluates 
the participation game’s comparative static predictions regarding participation cost.
5 As noted in 
the introduction another novel feature of our participation game experiment is that we employ 
competing groups of unequal sizes. 
Consider the following participation game that modifies the game in Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1983) to incorporate individual-specific uncertainty. There are M Blue voters and N 
non-Blue voters. Ex ante, a voter knows whether she is Blue or non-Blue. Moreover, it is 
common knowledge that after the vote takes place,  1 N  of the non-Blue voters will be chosen 
randomly as Green voters, and () 1 N N −  non-Blue voters will be chosen randomly as Red voters. 




P 1 =  denote the probability that a non-Blue voter will be chosen as a Green voter. 
Let  L P PG T ) 1 ( − + =  denote a non-Blue voter’s expected payoff when the reform takes place 
but before she learns whether she will be a Green or a Red voter. Consistent with the original 
argument by Fernandez and Rodrik, we shall assume that:  
A 1.  [] 0 ) 1 ( > − + − = − L P PG S T S  
This assumption means that when a non-Blue voter faces uncertainty regarding whether 
she will be Green or Red, she prefers the status quo to the reform.  
A 2.  ) )( ( ) )( ( 1 1 L S N N S G N M − − > − +  
This condition means that the total gain from the reform is larger than the total loss so 
                                                 
5 For example, Bornstein, Erev and Goren (1994) examine repeated play of an inter-group public goods (IPG) game 
and an inter-group prisoner’s dilemma (IPD) game. Appropriately reframed, their IPG game is a winner-takes-all 
election, and their IPD game is a proportional representation election. Bornstein (1992) studied these same games 
when subjects played them only once. Consistent with results in Schram and Sonnemans (1996a, 1996b), their 
subjects were less likely to free-ride in the IPG/winner-takes-all payoff structure.  12
that the reform constitutes a potential Pareto improvement over the status quo.
6 
A 3.  N M < and  ) ( ) ( 1 1 N N N M − > +  
Assumption A3 says that under uncertainty opponents of the reform constitute the 
majority, but when there is no uncertainty opponents of the reform constitute the minority. 
We shall also assume that all voters incur a voting cost of c. For simplicity, we also adopt 
a status quo tie-breaking rule; that is, for the reform to be implemented it must receive a strict 
majority of votes among the votes cast. In case of a tie vote, the status quo is maintained.
7 We 
also assume that voters vote for the outcome that provides them with the highest expected profit. 
This seemingly innocuous assumption could be violated if, for example, participants have 
strongly other-regarding or egalitarian preferences. But in a recent experiment that also features 
voting by five-person groups, Frechette et al. (2003) find that players quickly abandon proposals 
for egalitarian distributions of benefits in favor of highly unequal distributions that are 
qualitatively consistent with theoretical predictions. Moreover, their statistical analysis shows 
that players vote to maximize their own earnings and not to promote equality of payoffs. 
Let 
i
V EV  and  i
NV EV denote the expected payoffs to player i from voting and not voting, 
respectively, given the strategies of other players. Throughout the paper we assume risk 
neutrality.  This is a reasonable assumption for our experiment with its average payments of less 
than $30, and the model’s implications are qualitatively unchanged for moderate levels of risk 
                                                 
6 This is identical to the assumption FR employ in their model with zero costs of political participation. Our 
experiments include treatments with positive voting costs. But for all values of voting costs in our experiment, if the 
reform is brought about by one single voter supporting the reform while all others abstain, the reform will still 
constitute a potential Pareto improvement over the status quo. 
7 In our working paper (Cason and Mui, 2000) we show that as in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983), an alternative “coin 
flip” rule results in slightly more complicated expressions for the voting probabilities in this participation game with 
uncertainty, but it generates predictions that are qualitatively similar to the status quo tie-breaking rule. About 18 
percent of the votes in this experiment were tied.  13
aversion.
8 Denote by m (n) the total number of actual voters among the Blue voters (non-Blue 
voters) and by  i m ( i n ) the total number of actual voters among the Blues (non-Blues) other than 
i. The expected payoffs can be expressed as follows: 
For Blues:  
   11
ii i
V EV G prob m n S prob m n c  =+ > ++ ≤ −   
  
ii i
NV EV G prob m n S prob m n   => +≤    
For non-Blues:  
   11
jj j
V EV S prob n m T prob n m c  =+ ≥ ++ < −   
  
jj j
NV EV S prob n m T prob n m   =≥ +<    
It is easy to verify that this game does not have a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for c > 
0. In an earlier working paper (Cason and Mui, 2000) we show that similar to the model without 
uncertainty considered in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983), this game has two classes of Nash 
equilibria: mixed-pure strategy equilibria and totally mixed strategy quasi-symmetric equilibria. 
Since the mixed-pure strategy equilibria involve coordination that is rather implausible, we shall 
focus on the totally mixed strategy quasi-symmetric equilibria (hereafter referred to simply as 
mixed strategy equilibria).
9 These equilibria are quasi-symmetric because all voters of a 
                                                 
8 The main complication from adding risk aversion is that the indifference condition for the mixed strategy 
equilibrium cannot be simplified to an equation that involves a single key probability as shown in equations (2.1) 
and (2.2) below. But the same conclusions arise in a version of the model with risk aversion – for example, 
equilibrium vote probabilities vary monotonically with the voting cost c, and multiple equilibria of the type 
described below typically exist. As we show below, the observed behavior cannot be reconciled with risk neutral 
Nash equilibrium. We ultimately emphasize bounded rationality rather than risk aversion as an explanation of our 
observed deviations from the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, however. This is because risk aversion generally implies 
a reduction in the equilibrium voting probabilities for all types of voters, while the data usually indicate a voting rate 
that exceeds the risk neutral Nash equilibrium for at least one type of voter. The specific model of bounded 
rationality we use is consistent with this feature of the data. 
9 In the mixed-pure strategy equilibria, all voters of a particular type vote with a probability strictly between zero 
and one, while the voters of the other type are divided into two subgroups, one whose voters vote with certainty and 
one whose voters abstain with certainty. This type of equilibrium requires that voters of a particular type must be  14
particular type vote with the same probability strictly between zero and one. Suppose that the 
Blues vote with a probability  () 1 , 0 ∈ q and non-Blues vote with a probability  () 0, 1 r∈ . For the 
Blues to be willing to randomize, it must be the case that: 
()
ii i
VN V EV EV c prob m n G S  =⇔ = =−        (2.1) 
For the non-Blues to be willing to randomize, it must be the case that: 
() 1
jj j
VN V EV EV c prob n m S T  =⇔ = = − −        (2.2)   
When every Blue votes with probability q and every non-Blue votes with probability r,  
() ()






Mk N k ik k
k
MN





−   
 == − −    
   ∑  
() ()







Mk Nk jk k
k
MN





−   
 =−= − −     +    ∑  
Equations (2.1) and (2.2) can be rewritten, respectively, as:   
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The set of mixed strategy equilibria is characterized by equations (2.3) and (2.4). 
The participation game without uncertainty shares all the above assumptions, except that 
each non-Blue voter now knows whether she is Green or Red ex ante.
10 In this case, the Blue and 
the Green voters have identical preferences ex ante, so we simply refer to them as the 
                                                                                                                                                             
divided into subgroups of voters and non-voters in a precise way so that there is no uncertainty about how many 
votes one of the two alternatives will receive. Palfrey and Rosenthal (1983) consider these equilibria implausible, 
and Schram and Sonnemans (1996a) point out that they are especially implausible for the randomly regrouped 
(“strangers”) design that their (and our) experiment employs. 
10 In the absence of uncertainty, our participation game is identical to the participation game analyzed in Palfrey and 
Rosenthal (1983).   15
Blue/Green voters. Thus, by assumption A3, supporters of the reform constitute the majority. 
When every Blue/Green votes with probability q and every Red votes with probability r, for this 
Certain Roles environment it is straightforward to show that the set of mixed strategy equilibria 
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2.3 Theoretical Predictions 
Our objective is to understand how changes in the cost of political participation and the 
presence or absence of uncertainty affect the incidence of reform. This requires us to first 
analyze how these changes affect the political participation incentives for different types of 
agents. Figure 2 illustrates how the equilibrium voting probabilities vary with (i) the voting cost 
c and (ii) the presence or absence of uncertainty for the payoff parameters used in the 
experiment. This participation game has two types of totally mixed strategy equilibria in both the 
certainty and the uncertainty cases.  
A simple (non-strategic) cost-benefit reasoning suggests that since voting becomes less 
attractive as the voting cost (c) increases, an increase in the voting cost should cause all voters to 
decrease their probability of voting. Figure 2, however, indicates that an increase in c has 
opposite effects on the equilibrium behavior of the majority and the minority. Recall that 
Blue/Green voters constitute the majority in the Certain Roles treatment while non-Blue voters 
constitute the majority in the Uncertain Roles treatment. For the Type A equilibria, the majority’s 
probability of voting is decreasing in c, while the minority’s probability of voting is increasing in 
c. For the Type B equilibria, the majority’s probability of voting is increasing in c, while the  16
minority’s probability of voting is decreasing in c. Since these participation games involve more 
than two players, and a voter’s preferences between voting and abstaining depend on both q and 
r, we cannot use a simple best response function diagram to understand the intuition behind these 
comparative static results. We therefore developed the “strategic indifference curves” shown in 
Figures 3 and 4 to provide intuition.  
Figure 3 depicts the strategic indifference curves for the Certain Roles treatment with a 
voting cost of 0.3. The horizontal axis and vertical axis are r (the probability that a Red voter will 
vote) and q (the probability that a Blue/Green voter will vote). The curve labeled AA is a 
strategic indifference curve for a Blue/Green voter. This is a set of (r, q) combinations such that 
if a Blue/Green voter expects that all Red voters will vote with probability r and all Blue/Green 
voters other than herself will vote with probability q, then she will be indifferent between voting 
or not voting. The analogous curve labeled 
' 'A A  is a strategic indifference curve for a Red 
voter.
11 For now ignore the curve labeled EAR, which is useful in our subsequent discussion of 
the quantal response equilibrium. 
At the intersection point of the strategic indifference curves of the representative 
Blue/Green voter and the Red voter—for example, point  A E , where AA intersects 
' 'A A —the 
value of (r, q) is such that both types of voters are indifferent between voting or not. Therefore, 
an intersection point of the strategic indifference curves of both types of voters is a Nash 
equilibrium. Note that as long as we restrict our attention to quasi-symmetric equilibria, these 
strategic indifference curves can be used to analyze any team game—not just the participation 
game—that involves only two teams comprised of any finite number of players. 
                                                 
11 The term “indifference” here refers to the fact at any point on a strategic indifference curve a voter is indifferent 
between voting and abstaining. At two different points along a strategic indifference curve, however, a voter 
receives a different payoff. This differs from standard indifference curves in other economic applications such as in 
consumer theory.   17
In the diagram, each type of voter has two strategic indifference curves, which is why 
multiple equilibria exist. In particular, point A E  is the Type A equilibrium in which the majority 
(the Blue/Green voters) vote with a higher probability than the minority (the Red voters). Point 
B E , where BB (the “lower” strategic indifference curve for a Blue/Green voter) intersects 
' 'B B (the lower strategic indifference curve for a Red voter), is the Type B equilibrium in which 
the majority vote with a lower probability than the minority.  
Why does each type of voter have two strategic indifference curves? For all (r, q) 
combinations above AA, a Blue/Green voter prefers to abstain rather than to vote. A Blue/Green 
voter strictly prefers to abstain if (the probability of her vote being decisive) × (the benefit from 
getting her preferred outcome) < c.  In the region above AA, q is much larger than r, which 
implies that her Blue/Green group will almost certainly win. Therefore, the probability that her 
vote is decisive is too small to justify the cost of voting and she may as well free-ride on the 
efforts of her fellow team members. In the region bounded by her two indifference curves AA 
and BB, the race is sufficiently “close” so that she will strictly prefer to incur the cost to vote 
because there is a large enough probability that her vote will be decisive. In the region below BB, 
q is much less than r. The Blue/Green group will almost certainly lose in this situation. The 
probability of being decisive is again too small to justify the cost of voting and she may as well 
“give up” on the race. Similar explanations hold for the Red voter’s preferences, except that 
above 
' 'A A the Red voter prefers to abstain because her team is too “far behind” in the race, 
while below 
' 'B B she prefers to abstain because her team is almost certain to win.  
To illustrate the impact of differing voting costs, Figure 4 displays the voters’ strategic 
indifference curves for the Certain Roles treatment with a cost of voting c = 0.7 and c = 0.3. The 
curves labeled CC and DD (
' 'C C and 
' 'D D ) are the indifference curves for the Blue/Green voter  18
(the Red voter) when c = 0.7. The increase in c causes the upper indifference curves to shift to 
the Southeast, but it causes the lower indifference curves to shift to the Northwest. The 
competition between groups must be more intense to justify incurring the higher voting cost, so 
both types of voters abstain for more combinations of (r, q).
12 The intersection point of the upper 
indifference curves for the two types of voters—that is, the Type A equilibrium—therefore shifts 
from  A E  to 
'
A E , which involves a lower q and a higher r.  
Using the equilibrium r and q we can determine the equilibrium reform rate in the 
following way. Consider first the Certain Roles treatment.  Let m (n) denote the total number of 
actual voters among the Blue/Green voters (Red voters). Reform will take place only when 
n m >  under the status quo rule. Therefore reform will take place with probability:  
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Note that (2.7) also characterizes the equilibrium incidence of reform for the Uncertain 
Roles treatment when (i) m (n) denote the total number of actual voters among the Blue voters 
(Non-Blue voters) and (ii) q and r denote the probabilities that the Blue voters and the non-Blue 
voters vote in equilibrium, respectively. Figure 5 provides a comparison of how the equilibrium 
reform incidence varies with voting cost and for the Certain and Uncertain Role treatments. Note 
that Fernandez and Rodrik’s original prediction that the incidence of reform will be lower in the 
presence of uncertainty holds with positive voting costs only for the Type A equilibria. 
Moreover, note that the difference between the reform rates in the Certain and Uncertain Role 
                                                 
12 For example, consider the effect of an increase in c on the Type A equilibrium. A Blue/Green voter is indifferent 
between voting and abstaining when (the probability of her vote being decisive) × (the benefit from getting her 
preferred outcome) = c. When c = 0.3, any point that lies on AA satisfies this indifference condition. However, when 
c increases to 0.7, the only way to maintain this indifference condition is to increase the probability that a vote by 
the Blue/Green voter will be decisive. Since q is larger than r for any point on AA, this requires either a decrease in 
q, an increase in r, or both. Therefore, an increase in c causes the Blue/Green voter’s upper indifference curve to 
shift to the Southeast. Similar arguments explain why an increase in c causes the Red voter’s indifference curve to 
shift to the Southeast.  19
treatments declines as the voting cost increases. 
 
3. Experimental Design 
3.1 Treatment Variables, Design and Procedures 
We conduct treatments with voting costs of zero, 0.1, 0.3 and 0.7 experimental dollars. In 
the Certain Roles treatment it is clear from Table 1 that if Blue and Green subjects vote they 
should vote for the reform; and if Red subjects vote they should vote against the reform. In the 
Uncertain Roles treatment all Blue subjects learn their role before voting, but Green and Red 
subjects only learn that they are “non-Blue.” For a non-Blue subject the expected value of the 
reform is 10/3. This is less than the certain payoff of 5 from the status quo, so if non-Blue 
subjects vote they should vote against the reform. Consistent with the model presented above, 
these payoffs and the number of subjects of each type are common knowledge. 
We report 4 sessions using a total of 85 subjects. In each session 20 or 25 subjects vote in 
up to 40 decision periods. Decisions are framed as a choice between “outcome X” and “outcome 
Y.” In each period subjects choose to vote for either X or Y, or abstain. All sessions employ the 
status quo tie-breaking rule; that is, for the reform to be implemented it must receive a strict 
majority of votes. All sessions are implemented using a web browser interface. Appendix A 
contains the instructions, which include example choice computer screens.
13 
Each period the computer server randomly repartitions the 20 or 25 subjects in each 
session into four or five groups of five voters each. The server also randomly reassigns subjects 
                                                 
13 The instructions and decision screens use the voting terminology, unlike the more “neutral” terminology 
employed by Schram and Sonnemans (1996a, 1996b). Subjects in Schram and Sonnemans’ study participate in 
influencing the outcome by buying an imaginary “disc.” We believe that the voting terminology does not lead to a 
strong bias toward voting or abstaining. We therefore use this terminology to help subjects more readily understand 
the decision they face. In any case, this terminology is held constant across all sessions, so it cannot affect the 
conclusions regarding the comparative static hypotheses that are the focus of this research.  20
to Blue, Red or Green roles. Group and role assignments are always private information. This 
random and anonymous reassignment procedure (sometimes called a “strangers” design) 
substantially reduces the repeated game incentives that would arise if groups remained intact for 
a sequence of periods (see, e.g., Andreoni and Croson (2003) for a discussion).  
Subjects remained either certain or uncertain of their roles throughout a session, so we 
evaluate the impact of this treatment variable using a between-subjects comparison. The voting 
cost was varied within sessions, in ten-period blocks for each voting cost. That is, subjects 
participated in ten consecutive periods of one voting cost, followed by ten consecutive periods of 
another voting cost, and so on.
14 As shown in Table 2, each session began with a baseline block 
of zero voting costs, but the positive voting cost treatments were implemented in different orders 
in different sessions to avoid confounding the positive voting cost treatments with subject 
learning. We found no evidence that the treatment sequencing had a significant impact on 
behavior, so when presenting the results we pool the sessions. 
All subjects were students recruited from undergraduate economics classes at Purdue 
University. No subject participated in more than one session reported here. Subjects’ earnings 
during the experiment were denominated in experimental dollars, which were converted to U.S. 
dollars at a rate of 10 experimental dollars = 1 U.S. dollar. These earnings were paid in cash at 
the end of the experiment. Subjects’ earnings ranged between U.S. $16.00 and $29.25, with a 
mean of $22.52. Sessions lasted between 80 and 105 minutes, including the instruction time.   
Instructions were read aloud while subjects followed along on their own copy.  At the 
beginning of each new period block the experimenter wrote the new voting cost on the 
                                                 
14 Do to a software bug, occasionally we were unable to conduct all ten periods in a block. This could lead to 
problems with the interpretation of the results if we used a repeated (“partners”) design, because end-period effects 
might occur with repeated interaction of the same group of subjects. But since subjects were randomly reassigned to 
groups in a “strangers” design, we believe that this unexpected early termination is mostly inconsequential.  21
whiteboard, and the session was paused for a few minutes while subjects reset their web browser 
for the new block. No communication took place during the experiment. 
3.2 Hypotheses 
Figures 2 and 5 summarize the main comparative static predictions of this participation 
game’s mixed strategy Nash equilibria. The theoretical model highlights the fact that if the 
majority always vote with a higher probability than the minority—for example, if all the voters 
play according to the Type A equilibria both in the presence or absence of uncertainty—then 
uncertainty will reduce the incidence of reform. If, however, voters play the Type B equilibria (in 
which the minority vote with a higher probability than the majority) either in the presence or 
absence of uncertainty, then uncertainty may not decrease the incidence of reform. As we shall 
document later, the data are completely at odds with the Type B equilibria. Therefore, we focus 
on testing hypotheses derived from the comparative static predictions of the Type A equilibria. 
Hypothesis 1: (a) Reform occurs with a lower probability in the Uncertain Roles 
treatment than in the Certain Roles treatment when voting is costless; and (b) Reform occurs 
with a lower probability in the Uncertain Roles treatment than in the Certain Roles treatment 
when voting is costly.  
Part (a) of this hypothesis follows from the original argument in Fernandez and Rodrik 
(1991). Part (b) indicates that in this game with inter- and intra-group conflicts, there also exist 
equilibria in which individual-specific uncertainty can lead to resistance to reform, in a 
probabilistic sense. 
Hypothesis 2: (a) Reform likelihood is increasing in the voting cost in the Uncertain 
Roles treatment; and (b) reform likelihood is decreasing in the voting cost in the Certain Roles 
treatment.  22
The final hypothesis considers the voting rates of each type of voter. 
Hypothesis 3: In both the Certain Roles and Uncertain Roles treatments, (a) voters in the 
majority are less likely to vote as the voting cost increases; and (b) voters in the minority are 
more likely to vote as the voting cost increases. 
 
4. Results  
4.1. Does uncertainty lead to resistance to reform? 
We find that uncertainty does reduce the rate of reform in this environment with both 
inter- and intra-group conflicts. Figure 6 presents the reform rates when pooling across all 
periods. When subjects are certain of their roles, they implement the reform in 73 to 82 percent 
of the periods. Consistent with Fernandez and Rodrik’s original insight, adding uncertainty 
reduces the reform rate: in the Uncertain Roles treatment, subjects implement the reform in only 
47 to 66 percent of the periods.
15 
Although this reduction in the reform rate is smaller than predicted by the theoretical 
model, the first column of Table 3 formally tests Hypothesis 1 and indicates that uncertainty has 
a statistically significant impact on the likelihood of reform in all four voting cost treatments. In 
this probit regression model the dependent variable equals 1 if the reform takes place, and 0 
otherwise. The data are pooled across treatments, but the voting cost dummy variables and the 
                                                 
15 We do not present the time series of reform rates in Figure 6 because there exists little evidence of significant 
reform rate trends across periods. Reform rates rise only moderately (but by a statistically significant amount) in two 
or three of the eight treatment conditions. To establish this we regressed the reform rate on time using alternative 
specifications (e.g., period, 1/period, ln(period)), and found three cases in which the reform rate rose modestly over 
time: (1) with vote cost=0 and Certain Roles, the reform rate rose after periods 1 and 2 because several Blue/Green 
subjects incorrectly vote to maintain the status quo in period 1 and 2 of this initial treatment; (2) with vote cost=0.7 
and Uncertain Roles, the reform rate rose because more non-Blue subjects vote for the reform in later periods; and 
(3) with voting cost=0.1 and Uncertain Roles, there is (weaker) evidence that the reform rate rose because non-Blue 
subjects are less likely to vote in later periods—which leads to a higher reform rate since when non-Blue subjects 
vote they vote to maintain the status quo. We account for these minor time trends in the regression analysis in Table 
3.  23
interaction terms for the certainty treatment allow the impacts of certainty to differ in the various 
voting cost treatments.
16 All four certainty treatment interaction estimates are positive and highly 
significant, which indicates that in all four voting cost treatments the reform rates are higher 
when voters are certain of their payoff from reform. The positive estimate on ln(period) indicates 
that reform rates tend to increase over periods.
17 A series of Wald tests (not shown on the table) 
indicate that the impact of certainty is similar in all four voting cost treatments, since pairwise 
tests always fail to reject the null hypothesis of equality of the certainty interaction dummies 
(
2
1 d.f. χ  test statistics range between 0.04 and 3.37). 
Figure 7 displays the participation rates for each type of voter, and these rates suggest 
why uncertainty does not reduce the reform rate by a large amount in this environment.
18 Blue 
subjects in the Uncertain Roles treatment (and Blue/Green subjects in the Certain Roles 
treatment) strongly prefer reform, and they participate at relatively high rates—usually exceeding 
80 percent and only decreasing by a small amount as the voting cost increases. Red subjects in 
the Certain Roles treatment (and all non-Blue subjects in the Uncertain Roles treatment) prefer 
the status quo, but they participate at a lower rate and try to free ride on the votes of others in 
                                                 
16 The individual voting models presented below in Table 4 employ individual random subject effects to account for 
significant subject heterogeneity. Individual subject effects are obviously inappropriate for the present model of the 
group (reform) outcome, since these outcomes are determined by 5-subject groups that are randomly reshuffled each 
period. We explored but rejected the appropriateness of random session effects in these reform rate models (e.g., the 
relevant 
2
1 d.f. χ  test statistics were less than 0.1). It appears that our use of a random matching protocol averages out 
the subject heterogeneity across groups. 
17 Period is coded from 1 to 10 in each voting cost treatment, and is restarted at 1 at the beginning of each treatment. 
Alternative specifications (1/period, or simply period) provided qualitatively similar conclusions. 
18 Figure 7 does not display the time series of these voting rates, but we found very little evidence that these rates 
varied systematically over time. As with the reform rates, we regressed the voting rates on some time trends using 
alternative specifications (e.g., period, 1/period, ln(period)) to determine if any statistical evidence exists for 
significant changes in voting rates over time. Of the 16 separate time series of voting rates (4 voting costs × 2 
Certain/Uncertain Roles × 2 voter types in each treatment), we found a significant time trend in only one case: with 
vote cost=0.1 and Uncertain Roles, non-Blue subjects vote at a declining rate over time. We estimated alternative 
specifications of the voting models shown in Table 4 with time trends, but none of these trends even remotely 
approached standard significance levels. Therefore, to improve the efficiency of the Table 4 estimates we did not 
include an insignificant time trend.  24
their group. Consequently, they are frequently unable to maintain the status quo even though 
they benefit from the rule that the status quo wins any tie votes. Even when the status quo-
preferring subjects are in the majority (i.e., in the Uncertain Roles treatment) their lower 
participation allows them to maintain the status quo in only about half of the periods. Note that 
on average all types of voters reduce their participation rate as the participation cost increases. 
We show next that this observed behavior is inconsistent with the mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium of this participation game. 
4.2 Does an Increase in Participation Cost Reduce the Incidence of Reform and 
Participation?  
Note that even without reference to the theoretical model developed in Section 2, our 
experiment allows us to investigate empirically whether uncertainty reduces the incidence of 
reform. Relating the experimental findings to the theoretical model explicitly, however, provides 
a framework to evaluate how changes in participation cost affect the incidence of reform and 
participation.  
Figure 6 indicates that across all voting cost treatments, the reform rate is higher in the 
Certain Roles treatment. A comparison with Figure 5 indicates that this result is qualitatively 
consistent with the Type A equilibria, but is inconsistent with the Type B equilibria. Figure 5 also 
shows that in the Type A equilibria the reform rate also rises as the voting cost rises when voters 
face uncertainty, and it falls as the voting cost rises when voters do not face uncertainty. 
Contrary to this Hypothesis 2, the visual impression from Figure 6 is that the reform rate does 
not vary systematically with the voting cost. 
The regression results in the second and third columns of Table 3 are consistent with this 
impression. Column 2 presents a probit model of the reform rate for the Uncertain Roles  25
treatment, with dummy variables for the three positive voting cost treatments. The zero voting 
cost treatment is the omitted dummy variable, whose reform rate is captured by the intercept 
term. None of the voting cost dummy variable coefficients are significantly different from zero, 
indicating that the reform rates in these positive voting cost treatments are not significantly 
different from the reform rate with zero voting cost. Moreover, a Wald test fails to reject the null 
hypothesis that the voting cost=0.1 and voting cost=0.3 dummy variable coefficients are equal. 
The Wald tests do, however, reject the null hypothesis that the dummy variable coefficients for 
the voting cost=0.7 treatment are equal to those for the voting cost=0.1 and 0.3 treatments, in the 
direction predicted in Hypothesis 2(a). 
Column 3 of Table 3 reports the analogous regression for the Certain Roles treatment. As 
in the Uncertain Roles treatment, none of the voting cost dummy variable coefficients are 
significantly different from zero. The Wald tests indicate that the voting cost dummy variable 
coefficients are also not significantly different from each other, so the data from this treatment 
provide no evidence to support Hypothesis 2(b). 
Our analysis assumes that when subjects vote, they vote for the outcome that gives them 
a higher expected payoff. For example, Blue and Green subjects in the Certain Roles treatment 
should vote for the reform if they vote, and Red subjects should vote for the status quo if they 
vote. As an initial check that subjects understood these basic incentives, we examined the 
“misvote” rate in the Certain Roles treatment, where a misvote is defined as a status quo vote by 
a Blue or Green subject, or a reform vote by a Red subject. The misvote rate was 16.7 percent in 
the first two periods of these 40-period sessions, and it declined to 8.7 percent in the remaining 
periods of the initial zero voting cost treatment. In the positive voting cost treatments (periods 10 
through 40), the misvote rate varied between 3.1 and 4.4 percent. Similar results hold for the  26
Blue subjects in the Uncertain Roles treatment. Therefore, errors quickly decline to low levels, 
especially when compared to the error rates estimated in other settings such as voluntary 
contribution games (Andreoni, 1995; Houser and Kurzban, 2002). 
Given these low error rates, for now we focus on whether or not subjects vote. (We 
revisit misvotes later in the quantal response equilibrium analysis.) The overall voting rates 
shown in Figure 7 indicate that all voter types vote at a lower rate as the voting cost increases.
19 
This is consistent with the first part of Hypothesis 3, which predicts an inverse relationship 
between the voting cost and the voting rate for voters in the majority (i.e., Blue/Green voters in 
the Certain Roles treatment, and non-Blue voters in the Uncertain Roles treatment). But it is 
inconsistent with the second part of Hypothesis 3, which predicts that the voting rate for voters in 
the minority is increasing in the voting cost. Nevertheless, the voting rates overall are more 
consistent with the Type A equilibria for voters in the majority than for voters in the minority.
20 
Table 4 presents statistical evidence to document the negative relationship between 
voting cost and the voting rate displayed in Figure 7. These probit models have a dependent 
variable equal to 1 if the subject votes, and 0 otherwise. Individual subjects often vote at 
substantially different rates; for example, 10 of the 85 subjects vote in every period, while 9 
subjects vote in less than 60 percent of the periods. One subject never voted, while the other 84 
subjects voted in at least half of the periods. To account for this subject heterogeneity (and the 
                                                 
19 Moreover, 35 of the 85 individual subjects exhibit voting rates that (weakly) monotonically decline as the voting 
cost increases. 
20 For positive voting costs, voting rates for voters in the majority differ from the Type A equilibria by 0.03 to 0.14, 
while they differ from the Type B equilibria by 0.6 to 0.85. A binomial test (conducted for individual periods so that 
each subject contributes no more than one observation) for voters in the majority fails to reject the Type A 
equilibrium voting rate in 41 of 59 periods, but it never fails to reject the Type B equilibrium. Voting rates for voters 
in the minority are closer to the Type B equilibria, however. They are usually within 0.2 of the Type B equilibria, 
and are usually more than 0.3 away from the Type A equilibria. But neither type of equilibria accurately describes 
the behavior of the minority voters, which we address in the quantal response equilibrium analysis in the next 
subsection. For the minority voters, a binomial test fails to reject the Type B equilibria in 25 of the 49 periods in 
which it exists, and it fails to reject the Type A equilibria in 15 of the 59 periods.   27
repeated measures of this panel dataset), the estimates shown in Table 4 are based on a random 
subject effect error specification.  
The voting cost treatment dummy variables are negative in all of the models shown in 
Table 4, and they are highly significant for all but the Blue subjects in the Uncertain Roles 
treatment (column 3). The negative coefficient estimates indicate that subjects are less likely to 
vote when voting costs are positive, compared to the omitted dummy variable case of zero voting 
costs. These negative coefficient estimates are only consistent with the Type A equilibrium for 
the voters in the majority (columns 1 and 4); in this equilibrium the prediction is for positive 
coefficient estimates for the voters in the minority (columns 2 and 3).  Moreover, the Wald tests 
indicate that the voting likelihood can almost always be ordered inversely by the voting cost. 
Therefore, all types of voters participate at a lower rate as the voting cost increases. This is 
consistent with only the first part of Hypothesis 3.
21  
4.3 Can the quantal response equilibrium organize the data better? 
The Type A mixed strategy equilibria analyzed above accurately describe the 
participation rates for the subjects in the majority. But these equilibria predict that increases in 
the voting cost increase the voting rate of the minority voters, and this prediction is clearly 
inconsistent with the data. These equilibria also predict voting rates that are lower than observed 
for the subjects in the minority. More generally, it is well recognized that mixed strategy 
equilibria yield comparative static predictions that are often inconsistent with observed behavior 
                                                 
21 The reader may notice that the intra-group free-riding incentive faced by subjects in this participation game is 
similar in some respects to threshold public goods voluntary contribution games. Croson and Marks (2000) conduct 
a meta-analysis of such games and find that contributions are higher when the step-return (SR=aggregate group 
payoff from the public good/cost of meeting the contribution threshold) is higher. The (numerator) payoff in the SR 
definition is constant for our experiment, since reform and status quo payoffs are constant across treatments. Higher 
voting costs could lead to higher costs of meeting the threshold (the denominator), so our lower contribution 
(voting) rate for higher voting costs would seem to be consistent with Croson and Marks’ conclusion regarding the 
step-return. However, this participation game has the additional complication of an inter-group conflict, which 
makes the threshold endogenous since it depends on the contributions (votes) of the other group. Thus, the step-
return is also endogenous in this environment.  28
(see, for example Cheng and Zhu, 1995, and Goeree and Holt, 2000, and the references cited 
there). One unintuitive feature of mixed strategy equilibrium is that in deciding how to 
randomize between her set of available pure strategies, a player selects her choice probability so 
as to make others indifferent between a particular set of pure strategies. It is therefore natural to 
ask whether modifications to the equilibrium concept can explain the behavior of both the voters 
in the majority and the minority. Here we consider one such modification of Nash equilibrium—
the quantal response equilibrium (QRE)—developed for normal form games with finite strategy 
sets by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995). This approach does not abandon the concept of 
equilibrium, but it relaxes the assumption of perfect rationality. 
In a QRE, an agent’s expected payoff from each action is determined by the choice 
probabilities of the other agents. A quantal response is a smoothed-out best response, in the sense 
that a player does not choose a best response with probability one; instead, he chooses actions 
that yield higher expected payoffs with higher probability. A set of choice probabilities by all 
players constitute a QRE when each player’s choice probabilities are a stochastic best response 
to the choice probabilities of all other players. This kind of choice framework may be modeled 
by specifying the payoff associated with a choice as the sum of two terms.  One term is the 
expected utility of a choice, given the choice probabilities of other players. The second term is a 
random variable that reflects idiosyncratic aspects of payoffs that are not formally modeled.  
In the logit-QRE (see, for example, McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, Capra et al., 1999), 
which we consider here, each agent’s choice probabilities follow a multinomial logit distribution 
with an error parameter µ. This error parameter can be interpreted as the likelihood of making 
mistakes or incorrectly evaluating expected payoffs. In this voting experiment, subjects have 
three choices—(1) vote for the outcome with the highest expected payoff; (2) vote for the  29
alternative outcome (referred to above as a misvote); or (3) abstain. Index these three choices 
i=V, MV and NV, respectively, and denote the expected payoff of choice i as EVi. These expected 
payoffs are determined by the choice probabilities of other agents. The choice probabilities in a 















, i= V, MV and NV.       (4.1) 
In this formulation, as the error parameter µ decreases each agent puts less weight on 
choices that yield sub-optimal expected payoffs. As µ approaches zero, the choice probabilities 
are very sensitive to expected payoff differences, so QRE outcomes approach the standard mixed 
strategy equilibria presented in Section 2. As µ increases, behavior essentially becomes random 
since choice probabilities depend less and less on expected payoffs, and in the limit each agent 
places equal (1/3) probabilities one each of the three pure strategies. 
Figure 8 illustrates how the vote probabilities change in the QRE as µ increases for one 
of the experimental treatments. The equilibrium misvote rates (shown with the dotted lines) start 
at 0 for low µ before rising above 0.1 once µ reaches about 1. The curve EAR in Fig ure 3 
illustrates the impact of increasing µ in the (r, q) space, linking the Nash equilibrium (µ = 0) to 
totally random behavior (µ = ∞) denoted by R. Note that although the QRE has the free 
parameter µ, this curve illustrates that it implies a specific path that connects EA to R as µ varies. 
It is not the case that by varying µ one can make the QRE consistent with any observed behavior. 
Importantly, in this game a QRE with a small amount of decision error is consistent with 
both of the empirical findings that could not be explained by the mixed strategy Nash 
equilibrium—that all voters abstain at relatively low rates and that voting rates decrease for both 
voters in the majority and the minority as voting costs increase. Note from Figure 8 how  30
minority (Red) voters in the Certain Roles treatment abstain at a lower rate as µ rises above 0. In 
this treatment we observed these voters abstain about 40 percent of the time (recall Figure 7), far 
below the Nash equilibrium (µ=0) abstain rate of 80 percent. A small amount of decision error 
(µ≥0.2), however, reduces the QRE abstain rate for this type of voter to below 40 percent. 
Moreover, numerical calculations for all experimental treatments indicate that as long as the 
error rate µ exceeds approximately 0.2, QRE voting rates decline with increases in the voting 
cost for all voter types. By contrast, in the Nash equilibria one type of voter always increases her 
voting rate as the voting cost increases.  
Table 5 reports maximum likelihood estimates of the error rate µ for the logit-QRE. The 
results indicate a moderate level of decision noise ranging between µ=0.41 and 0.58 that is rather 
consistent across treatments. A Wald test is unable to reject the null hypothesis that these µ 
estimates are not significantly different across the four Uncertain Roles voting costs (
2
3 d.f. χ  = 
4.86), but this test does reject the null of equal µ across the four Certain Roles voting costs 
(
2
3 d.f. χ  = 9.54; five-percent critical value = 7.82). The value of the likelihood function estimated 
for the QRE is substantially greater than the simple behavioral benchmark of random play (i.e., 
one-third probability on all three pure strategies).  
Compared to the Nash equilibrium, the QRE more accurately describes the voting rates, 
abstain rates and misvote rates. For example, in the Nash equilibrium one type of voter always 
votes at a lower rate when the voting cost increases, but with the exception of c=0 with Certain 
Roles, the QRE correctly predicts that the abstention rate increases with the voting cost for both 
minority and majority votes. The point predictions of the QRE are particularly accurate for 
voters in the majority. Also consistent with the data but inconsistent with the Nash equilibrium, 
the QRE usually predicts that participation rates typically exceed 50 percent for both minority  31
and majority voters. There is still room for improvement, of course. In particular, for the higher 
vote costs, the QRE for Red voters in the Certain Roles treatment predicts higher participation 
rates than observed; and the QRE for Blue voters in the Uncertain Roles treatment fails to predict 




This paper highlights the importance of inter- and intra-group conflicts in the political 
economy of reform, using the setting of the Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) model that emphasizes 
the importance of individual-specific uncertainty. We study whether or not uncertainty will lead 
to resistance to reform in the presence of both kinds of conflicts, as well as how changes in the 
cost of political participation affect the incidence of reform and the incidence of participation by 
both reform supporters and opponents. In our experiment, we find that (i) uncertainty does 
reduce the incidence of reform even when both inter- and intra-group conflicts are present due to 
costly political participation; (ii) an increase in the cost of political participation reduces the 
participation of all agents, regardless of whether they belong to the majority or minority; and (iii) 
overall, changes in the cost of political participation do not have significant impact on the 
incidence of reform in this experiment. We also demonstrate that our finding that a change in the 
cost of political participation has similar impacts on both the majority and minority is 
inconsistent with a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, but is consistent with the quantal response 
equilibrium.  
Besides providing experimental evidence that uncertainty can lead to non-adoption of 
reform even with costly political participation, our findings also generate interesting questions 
for future theoretical and field studies on reform. The experiment shows that all types of subjects  32
participate at a lower rate as the political participation cost increases, contrary to the Nash 
equilibrium prediction for this participation game. If future laboratory studies indicate that the 
negative relationship between participation costs and participation rates for both the majority and 
the minority is robust, this suggests that researchers should investigate whether this regularity is 
also observed in the field, as well how this behavior may be important in determining whether 
reform will take place. Furthermore, our analysis shows that a quantal response equilibrium 
approach that allows for bounded rationality in decision-making provides a reasonably good 
explanation of the data. The literature on the political economy of reform has recognized the 
potential importance of bounded rationality, although there has been only limited effort to 
investigate its importance in formal models (see, for example, Robinson, 1998, and Drazen, 2000 
for discussion on this issue). Our findings suggest that models that allow for both strategic 
interactions and bounded rationality may be useful in studying the political economy of reform.  
Finally, this study introduces intra-group conflict by simply assuming that each agent 
incurs the same cost of political participation regardless of whether she belongs to the group 
opposing or supporting the reform. Future research can study richer environments that allow for 
other kinds of heterogeneity. For example, as emphasized in the recent literature on special 
interest politics (see, for example, Grossman and Helpman, 2001), special interest group 
members may decide not only whether to participate in the group’s effort to defeat the other 
group in influencing the policy outcome, but also how  much to participate in this process. 
Members within the same group may also have different impacts on the groups’ ability to 
influence political outcomes. Heterogeneity can also arise when the majority and the minority 
face different costs of political participation. This can be the case, for example, for reforms that 
cause a conflict between urban and rural interests.    33
Table 1: Subject Roles and Payoffs for Each Policy Outcome 
  Blue Subjects  Green Subjects  Red Subjects 
Number of that Type  2  1  2 





















Table 2: Summary of Four Experimental Sessions 




















































Table 3: Probit Regressions of Reform Outcomes 
 
Dependent Variable = 1 if Reform is adopted, =0 otherwise 
 










































Certainty Dummy Variable * 




Certainty Dummy Variable * 




Certainty Dummy Variable * 




Certainty Dummy Variable * 










Wald Test of VCDUM1 = 
VCDUM3 (χ
2 with 1 d.f.) 
  0.02 0.26 
Wald Test of VCDUM3 = 
VCDUM7 (χ
2 with 1 d.f.) 
  5.12* 0.13 
Wald Test of VCDUM1= 
VCDUM7 (χ
2 with 1 d.f.) 
  4.60* 0.03 
Number of Observations  643  300  343 
Log likelihood function  -377.3  -201.7  -175.6 
Restricted log likelihood  -404.7  -206.4  -177.6 
Significance of Regression  < 0.001  0.049  0.422 
Notes: Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * (**) indicates that the coefficient estimate is 
significantly different from zero or the test statistic rejects the indicated null hypothesis at the 5 
percent (1 percent) significance level.  35
 
Table 4: Probit Regressions of Voting Decision 
 
Dependent Variable = 1 if the subject votes in the current period, =0 if the subject abstains 
 


























































Wald Test of VCDUM1 
= VCDUM3 (χ
2 with 1 d.f.) 
4.35* 7.29**  0.42  12.95* 
Wald Test of VCDUM3 
= VCDUM7 (χ
2 with 1 d.f.) 
9.94** 17.73**  9.30**  8.61** 
Wald Test of VCDUM1 
= VCDUM7 (χ
2 with 1 d.f.) 
24.38** 42.84**  9.36**  61.69** 
Number of Observations  1029  686  600  900 
Log likelihood function  -284.7  -333.1  -119.7  -428.9 
Restricted log likelihood  -396.1  -440.9  -144.3  -560.3 
Significance of 
Regression 
< 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001  < 0.001 
Notes: Models are estimated using a random effects error structure, with the subject as the 
random effect. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. * (**) indicates that the coefficient 
estimate is significantly different from zero or the test statistic rejects the indicated null 
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  Figure 1: Example Gains and Losses from Reform (Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) example)
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This is an experiment in decision making.  The instructions are simple and if you follow them 
carefully when making a decision, you might earn a significant amount of money. All earnings on 
your computer screens and your record sheet are in Experimental Dollars. These Experimental 
Dollars will be converted to U.S. Dollars at the end of the experiment, at a rate of 10 Experimental 
Dollars = 1 U.S. Dollar.  These earnings will be paid to you privately, in cash, at the end of the 
experiment. 
 
Your commitment to us: NO UNNECESSARY TALKING. This is serious research, and we are 
genuinely interested in the decisions you make. It is important that you avoid all unnecessary 
communication among yourselves. If you need clarification or explanation, please ask one of the 
experimenters. Please refrain from all unnecessary comments or remarks. 
 
Our commitment to you: NO DECEPTION. This research will be conducted exactly as we describe. 
In fact, if we deceive you in any way we would get in trouble with the University human subjects 
protection committee. We promise to relay all information about the experiment accurately and 
completely.  
 
The total number of participants in this experiment today is      . During the experiment you will 
interact in a sequence of up to 40 decision “periods.” In each period you will be randomly formed 
into groups of five persons. The computer will randomly reassign you into groups of five persons 
each period. Everyone has an equal chance of being assigned with any other four participants. The 
computer will also randomly determine each person’s “role” in each group, and these roles will also 
be randomly reassigned each period. Everyone has an equal chance at being in each role within each 
group. All of these assignments are totally random and are not affected by any decisions anyone 
makes during the experiment. You will never learn the identity of the persons you are assigned with 





You will decide each period if you want to vote for outcome X, outcome Y, or abstain from voting. 
(Abstaining means you decide not to vote.) If you decide to vote, you will pay a “voting cost” that is 
subtracted from your earnings. If you decide to abstain, then you do not pay any voting cost. The 
voting cost will be written on the whiteboard and will be displayed on your computer screen. 
    
How the Outcome is Determined by the Votes 
 
If either X or Y receives a majority of votes cast, it will be the chosen (“winning”) outcome. In the 
event that both outcome X and outcome Y receive an equal number of votes (including the case in 







Your earnings are determined by your role and the votes cast by members of your five-person group. 
Figure 1 (which will be shown in color on your computer) displays the earnings to persons in each 
role, before the voting cost is subtracted. For example, if outcome Y is chosen by the group, anyone 
who is in the Blue or Green roles this period receives earnings of 8, and anyone who is in the Red 




Example 1: Suppose your role is Blue and you vote, and the voting cost is 0.3. Y receives 2 votes and 
X receives 1 vote. Y wins. Your gross payoff is 8, and your net total payoff this period is 8–0.3 = 7.7. 
 
Example 2: Suppose your role is Blue and you do not vote, and the voting cost is 0.3. Y receives 1 
vote and X receives 1 vote. X wins because the vote is tied. Your gross payoff is 5, and your net total 
payoff this period is 5–0 = 5. (You subtract a voting cost of 0 in this example because by abstaining 
you avoid the voting cost.) 
    
Example 3: Suppose your role is Blue and nobody in your group votes, so both X and Y tie with 0 
votes apiece. X wins because the vote is tied. Your gross payoff is 5, and your net total payoff this 




Figure 1 displays your voting screen. You will make your decision (either vote for X, vote for Y, or 
do not vote) and then press the send button. You must wait for all other participants to make their 
decisions, so please be patient. Once all decisions are sent in, your computer will display a screen like 
Figure 2. This screen will report the vote outcomes, remind you of your decision, and inform you of 





Information and Numbers in Each Role ( Note: The paragraph shown in italics was the only 
paragraph in this section for the Certain Roles treatment. The other two paragraphs comprise this 
section for the Uncertain Roles treatment.) 
 
All participants learn what their role is—Blue, Green or Red—before voting. In today’s experiment 
each group will have 2 Blue participants, 1 Green participant, and 2 Red participants.  
 
In each period, participants who have been randomly assigned the Blue role learn what their role is 
before voting. Participants who have been randomly assigned the Green or Red roles do not learn 
what their role is until after everyone in the experiment has finished voting for the period. Their 
computer will simply inform them that they are “Non-Blue.” Earnings—which are determined after 
voting—are calculated based on the actual role (either Green or Red) of these Non-Blue participants. 
If the group chooses outcome Y then all Non-Blue participants will learn whether they have been    
assigned the role of a Green or a Red participant. If the group chooses outcome X then both the Non-
Blue participants earn the same amount (5). So if X is chosen the Green and Red participants will not 
learn their exact role since this information is irrelevant for determining earnings in outcome X 
periods. 
 
In today’s experiment, in each period, each group will have 2 Blue participants, 1 Green participant, 
and 2 Red participants. Therefore, there are 3 Non-Blue participants. If you learn that you are Non-
Blue, since roles are assigned randomly you know that there is a 1/3 chance that you are a Green 
participant and a 2/3 chance that you are a Red participant. 
 
Summary for the Decisions in the First 40 Periods 
 
•   You will be randomly reassigned each period into groups of five. The role assignments are also 
random. 
•   If you vote for X or Y you pay the voting cost. If you abstain you do not pay the voting cost. 
•   The winning outcome (either X or Y) is the outcome that receives the most votes. A tie vote 
means X wins. 
•   Your earnings depend on your role, the winning outcome, and whether you voted. Your voting 
screen (Figure 1) displays the gross earnings for each role, for each outcome. You receive the net 
earnings, which is this gross amount minus the voting cost (which you pay if and only if you 
voted), as shown in Figure 2. 
•   Each group of five has 2 Blue, 1 Green, and 2 Red participants. Everyone learns their role before 
voting. (This bullet point was shown only in the Certain Roles treatment. The following two bullet 
points were shown only in the Uncertain Roles treatment.) 
•   Each group of five has 2 Blue, 1 Green, and 2 Red participants.  
•   Blue participants always learn their role before voting, Green and Red participants only learn that 
they are not Blue before voting. After voting everyone learns their earnings, and the Green and 
Red participants learn their exact role if Y is chosen by the group. 
Are there any questions now before we begin the experiment?     
 
Your  Name:         S e s s i o n   N a m e :       Your Login ID:       
 
 
Period  Your role  
(circle one) 
Your vote  
(circle one) 
Winner and vote totals  Your 
earnings 
Cumulative (Overall) 
winnings (see bottom 
of screen) 
1  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
2  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
3  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
4  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
5  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
6  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
7  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
8  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
9  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
10  Blue    Red     Green  X        Y      Abstain            wins by          to          . $  $ 
 